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Hierarchies of Discrimination in Baby Making? 
A Response to Professor Carroll 
RADHIKA RAO* 
First, I applaud Professor Carroll’s effort to examine these issues through the 
lens of equality rather than through the lens of liberty.1 I myself advocated such an 
approach in Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive 
Equality.2 The reason for the turn to equality is that the prospect of discrimination 
with respect to assisted reproductive technologies is very troubling, but finding a 
fundamental right to procreate with the assistance of reproductive technology and 
reproductive collaborators goes much too far. Such an approach would appear to 
invalidate almost every law restricting access to the technology or the materials 
necessary for procreation, including laws limiting the number of in vitro embryos 
that could be implanted in a woman’s body at the same time, or even laws 
proscribing reproductive cloning. 
Professor Carroll may be correct when she contends that it does not matter 
whether or not there is a fundamental right to procreate that encompasses 
surrogacy, if marital status discrimination with respect to surrogacy is not rationally 
related to any legitimate governmental purpose.3 That was clearly true of Italy’s 
Law 40, which confined use of ARTs to married or “stable” heterosexual couples 
while at the same time denying use of the technology to single persons and 
homosexuals.4 Italy’s marital status requirement could not be justified as protecting 
children by ensuring that they are born into stable two-parent families because the 
law permitted unmarried but “stable” heterosexual couples access to ARTs, yet 
refused to extend the same privileges to equally stable homosexual couples. 
Stripped of the familial stability rationale, such a law fails any level of review and 
hence should be deemed unconstitutional: it is revealed as resting solely upon 
societal disapproval or prejudice, rather than any legitimate governmental interest. 
But is marital status discrimination always irrational? Professor Mutcherson 
points out that there may be good reasons to restrict surrogacy to married couples: 
A state that draws a marital status distinction . . . could persuasively 
argue that it is using marriage as a shorthand or proxy for other 
elements that the state prefers to see when people engage in a process 
with the end goal of creating a child for whom the state has an 
obligation to provide protection.5 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
 1. See Andrea B. Carroll, Discrimination in Baby Making: The Unconstitutional 
Treatment of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1187 (2013). 
 2. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive 
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008). 
 3. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1197. 
 4. See Rao, supra note 2, at 1458–59. 
 5. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, How Parents Are Made: A Response to Discrimination in 
Baby Making: The Unconstitutional Treatment of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy, 
88 IND. L.J. 1207, 1215 (2013). 
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A direct inquiry into the economic and emotional stability of the parties who intend 
to parent a child is difficult to conduct, so states could use marriage as a substitute 
to determine who should have access to surrogacy. And if this rationale provides 
the real basis for the state’s restriction of surrogacy to married couples and is 
applied evenhandedly,6 then Professor Mutcherson is absolutely correct to conclude 
that “[t]he state . . . is not drawing baseless distinctions but is using data to help 
discern what circumstances are most likely to produce the familial stability that 
children need.”7 But if marital status is not a proxy for gauging familial stability but 
a pretext for other, more invidious forms of discrimination, then it may not survive 
rational basis review—at least not the rigorous form of rational basis review 
applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,8 or by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.9 Thus, the 
case against marital status discrimination is much more difficult and complicated 
than Professor Carroll’s paper would seem to suggest. 
But the flaws in Professor Carroll’s analysis go even further. While arguing 
eloquently against one form of discrimination—discrimination on the basis of 
marital status—Professor Carroll implicitly endorses and even encourages another 
kind of discrimination by drawing a bright line between traditional and gestational 
surrogacy.10 In so doing, Professor Carroll substitutes one category of 
discrimination for another, effectively favoring genetic over gestational mothers. 
Professor Carroll contrasts traditional surrogacy, which would “force[] a genetic 
mother to comply with an agreement she made, in advance of a child’s birth . . . to 
relinquish her own child,”11 with gestational surrogacy, asserting that “[t]he same 
risks and societal concerns do not necessarily arise in this alternate form of 
surrogacy”12 because “[i]n gestational surrogacy, the surrogate merely acts as a 
carrier for the child. Her role is gestational in nature, and, by definition, she is not 
genetically related to the child she gestates, who is the genetic child of the intended 
parents.”13 Professor Carroll is not alone in her stance: several states appear to 
apply a similar approach by refusing to enforce traditional surrogacy contracts 
while at the same time sanctioning gestational surrogacy.14 The Uniform Parentage 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See Rao, supra note 2, at 1476 (suggesting that the familial stability rationale does 
not warrant discrimination against “married homosexuals, who exhibit as much stability and 
commitment as married heterosexuals”). 
 7. Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 1215. 
 8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 10. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1190–1191. 
 11. Id. at 1190 (emphasis added). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 63.212–.213, 742.15–.16 (West 2010, 2012 & Supp. 2013) 
(distinguishing between gestational surrogacy contracts, which are enforced if one of the 
intended parents is genetically related to the child, and traditional surrogacy, called a 
“preplanned adoption agreement,” under which the birth mother is given forty-eight hours 
after birth to change her mind); Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 45/6, 47/10–70, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12 (West 2009, 2011) (enforcing 
gestational surrogacy contracts while remaining silent on the status of traditional surrogacy); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (2010) (enforcing gestational surrogacy contracts); N.D. 
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Act (UPA) also adopts this position by recommending that gestational surrogacy 
contracts should be deemed enforceable and effective to transfer parental rights, 
while leaving the status of traditional surrogacy in legal limbo.15 Thus, disparate 
treatment of these two types of surrogacy appears to be accepted without question 
under current law.16 
But why should the law treat gestational surrogacy so differently from 
traditional surrogacy? Professor Carroll provides scant justification or explanation 
besides her assertion that “[i]n a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate does not have 
any genetic connection to the child, making the relinquishment bargain she makes 
less offensive.”17 Is Professor Carroll implying that parenthood is determined by 
genetic ties rather than by gestational connections, so that a woman who gestates 
without a genetic connection would not be deemed the legal mother of the child? 
This appears to be the unspoken premise underlying her pronouncement that a 
gestational surrogate should be deemed a mere “carrier” and not the real mother of 
the child.18 But as a factual matter, this is not necessarily true. Indeed, most states 
                                                                                                                 
CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -08; 14-19-01; 14-20-01 to -66 (2009) (distinguishing between 
gestational surrogacy contracts, which are legal and enforceable, and traditional surrogacy 
contracts, which are void and unenforceable); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 to -809 
(LexisNexis 2012) (permitting gestational surrogacy contracts while prohibiting traditional 
surrogacy); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.751–.763 (2008) (explicitly allowing gestational 
surrogacy as long as the surrogate does not use her own eggs). 
 15. Article 8 of the UPA substitutes the term “gestational mother” for “surrogate 
mother,” the term that was previously used, on the grounds that “gestational mother” is a 
more appropriate term because it includes both a woman who gestates a child without being 
that child’s genetic mother and a woman who is both the genetic and gestational mother. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 2012). Thus, 
although the UPA uses the term “gestational mother,” it defines gestational mother 
inclusively to include a woman who may also possess a genetic connection to the child. 
However, the comments to this section of the UPA make it clear that the term “gestational 
mother” was deliberately selected because the majority of ART practitioners try to avoid the 
scenario in which a woman supplies both egg and womb on the rationale that “the 
gestational mother’s genetic link to the child too often creates additional emotional and 
psychological problems in enforcing a gestational agreement.” Id. 
 16. Professor Elizabeth Scott carefully describes how and why the social and political 
meanings of surrogacy have changed over the last decades and the process by which 
gestational surrogacy became normalized, pointing out that “[t]he move to gestational 
surrogacy has facilitated the change in the social meaning of surrogacy from a mother’s sale 
of her baby to a transaction involving the provision of gestational services. It is telling that 
gestational surrogates are often described as ‘carriers,’ rather than as ‘mothers.’” Elizabeth 
S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 
140 (2009); see also June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage 
Unnecessary Risks?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 335 (2010) (“[T]he acceptance of surrogacy, 
legally and practically, followed from the separation of genetic and gestational motherhood. 
While the initial cases frowned on the practice, modern law in states that range from Texas 
to Illinois and Virginia to California and Florida expressly authorizes the practice. 
Psychological and legal acceptance closely followed the change in the nature of the genetic 
relationship.”). 
 17. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1191. 
 18. See Scott, supra note 16, at 141 (“The relatively positive response to gestational 
surrogacy suggests that gestational motherhood is devalued when it is separated from genetic 
parenthood—and perhaps that surrogates who are not also genetic mothers, unlike traditional 
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have statutes which presume that the woman who gives birth is the legal mother of 
the child.19 Moreover, even in Johnson v. Calvert,20 the most famous gestational 
surrogacy case, the California Supreme Court ruled that both the woman who 
provided the egg and the woman who gestated had provided sufficient evidence of 
maternity to be deemed the biological mother of the resulting child.21 In that case, 
the court used intent as a tiebreaker to determine which of these two women should 
be deemed the legal mother of the child, awarding custody to the genetic parents 
rather than the gestational surrogate.22 But if a woman gestated a child conceived 
with the egg of another with the intention of rearing the child as her own, the 
California Supreme Court would have declared the gestator to be the legal mother 
of the child.23 Surely, Professor Carroll does not mean to suggest that, in such a 
case, a gestational mother who lacks a genetic connection should be treated as a 
legal stranger to her child? 
Perhaps Professor Carroll believes that enforcement of the relinquishment 
bargain made by a gestational surrogate is less offensive because gestational 
surrogates who lack a genetic connection generally feel less attachment to the 
resulting child. Yet this may not always be the case. For many women, gestation 
rather than genetics may be the source of their maternal bond with the child. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court relied upon the strength of the gestational connection 
between mother and child to justify a gender-based citizenship presumption that 
essentially discriminated against genetic fathers.24  Professor Carroll does not really 
defend her assumption that one biological connection—the genetic tie—should 
trump the other biological connection with the child, nor does she provide a reason 
why we should privilege genes over gestation. Indeed, it could be argued that an 
approach that favors the genetic tie over the lengthy and arduous physical process 
of gestation and childbirth ironically replicates the wrongs of patriarchy, which 
typically denigrated or dismissed the importance of women’s unique contributions 
while exalting the male role in providing the seed and ultimately viewing children 
as the genetic property of their fathers. Of course, Professor Carroll’s approach is 
more egalitarian in its conclusion that children should be viewed as the genetic 
property of both the male and female progenitors! 
Are there good reasons for the law to prefer gestational surrogacy to traditional 
surrogacy? Some might suggest that the prevalence of gestational surrogacy 
contracts today reflects widespread parental preferences—people prefer to have 
                                                                                                                 
surrogates, might be expected not to form a maternal bond with a child who ‘belongs’ to 
others.” (emphasis in original)). 
 19. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Jus Sanguinis: Determining Citizenship for Assisted 
Reproduction Children Born Overseas 18 (March 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181026 (pointing out that State Department policy 
conflicts with the law in most states, which generally presume that the woman who gives 
birth to a child is the child’s mother); see also Carbone, supra note 16, at 338. 
 20. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 21. Id. at 782. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding gender-based presumption that 
automatically awarded U.S. citizenship to children born to citizen-mothers, while requiring 
proof of an actual connection in order to confer citizenship upon the genetic children of 
citizen-fathers). 
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children who are the product of their own genes, rather than the genes of others.25 
But if so, why should the law simply ratify such private preferences? Moreover, 
intending parents often choose gestational surrogacy even when the child is not the 
product of their own eggs and sperm but of donated gametes. This suggests that the 
preference for gestational surrogacy is a consequence of legal regulation rather than 
the cause—the preference for gestational surrogacy may actually be the result of 
legal rules that clearly enforce gestational surrogacy contracts while leaving open 
the status of traditional surrogacy. If this is so, then the desire to disconnect the 
genetic and the gestational components of motherhood may be an artifact of the 
law. Disentangling the various elements of reproduction makes it more difficult to 
label a gestational surrogate as a “mother” whose claims to the child may trump 
those of the intending parents.26 Thus, the fragmentation of parenthood into 
multiple parts may serve no purpose other than to alienate women from the 
products of their labor—figuratively and literally—in order to facilitate the transfer 
of legal rights to the resulting children. 
Moreover, if there is good reason to distinguish between these two forms of 
surrogacy, one could argue that the result should be exactly the other way around. 
Gestational surrogacy, because it requires in vitro fertilization, is more risky and 
invasive than traditional surrogacy. In vitro fertilization requires ingestion of drugs 
to hyperstimulate a woman’s ovaries, encouraging the release of multiple eggs 
which will be retrieved through laparoscopy, a procedure in which a lengthy needle 
is inserted in a woman’s navel.27 And fertilization of these eggs with sperm occurs 
externally in a petri dish, rather than inside the womb. All of these procedures 
entail certain risks to both women and children, and they are also much more 
expensive than artificial insemination. If protecting health and safety is the primary 
purpose of regulation, then the law should promote traditional surrogacy over 
gestational surrogacy. Yet disparate legal treatment of these two forms of surrogacy 
actually seems to have prompted a shift from the cheaper and less invasive, 
low-tech procedure of artificial insemination to the risky and expensive high-tech 
alternative, not for any good reasons, but arguably because of unthinking 
stereotypes and prejudices that endow genes with greater significance than other 
biological connections and envision a gestational surrogate as a mere “carrier” and 
not the real mother. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Professor Carbone suggests that the separation of genetic and gestational parenthood 
might also be the result of intending parents’ desire to negate unwanted genetic ties. See 
Carbone, supra note 16, at 338. 
 26. Cf. I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1135 (2008) (arguing that there is no “naked” right not to be a genetic parent, 
unbundled from the obligations of gestational and legal parenthood). 
 27. Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of 
Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1058 
& n.13 (2006). 
